Hofstra Law Review
Volume 3 | Issue 3

Article 10

1975

Douglaston Civic Association, Inc. v. Galvin
Joel H. Joseph

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr
Recommended Citation
Joseph, Joel H. (1975) "Douglaston Civic Association, Inc. v. Galvin," Hofstra Law Review: Vol. 3: Iss. 3, Article 10.
Available at: http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol3/iss3/10

This document is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Hofstra Law
Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law. For more information, please contact lawcls@hofstra.edu.

Joseph: Douglaston Civic Association, Inc. v. Galvin

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
DOUGLASTON CIVIC ASSOCIATION, INC. v. GALVIN
ZONING-Judicial Review-Standing-an appropriate representative associationshould have standing to assert rights of its
members where such persons may be affected by a determination
of a zoning board. 173 N.Y.L.J. 16, Jan. 23, 1975, at 1, col. 7 (N.Y.
Ct. of App. Dec. 20, 1974).
In the recent case of Douglaston Civic Association, Inc. v.
Galvin' New York's highest court, in a unanimous opinion by
Judge Jasen, granted standing to a civic association 2 to contest
the grant of a variance by a board of zoning appeals 3 by means
of an order of certiorari.' While the question of standing of a civic
association is not an altogether new one in New York, this case
represents the first occasion on which the Court of Appeals has
given the issue a thorough airing and come to a clear-cut conclu1. 173 N.Y.L.J. 16, Jan. 23, 1975, at 1, col. 7 (N.Y. Ct. of App. Dec. 20, 1974).
2. For a definition and analysis of the term "civic association" see note 30 infra.
3. The Standard State Zoning Enabling Act recommended by the U.S. Department
of Commerce in 1926 calls the administrative board set up to grant relief from the zoning
ordinance a "board of adjustment." U.S. Dm'T OF COMMERCE, A STANDARD STATE ZONING
ENABLING ACr UNDER WICH MuNIcIPAms MAY ADOPT ZONING REGULATIONS § 7 (1926)

(hereinafter cited as SSZEA). Many states retain this terminology, while others use
"board of zoning appeals" or simply "board of appeals." In New York City, where the
instant action took place, the body is called "Board of Standards and Appeals." N.Y.C.
CHARTER & ADhIN. CODE ch. 27 tit. A (1972). There does not appear to be any substantive
difference in the terminology.
4. An article 78 proceeding, under N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 7801-06 (McKinney 1963), authorized under N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 668e-1.0 (1970). This method of judicial review of
administrative zoning decisions originated with the Standard Act, which provided for
presentation "to a court of record a petition . . . setting forth that such decision [of the
board of adjustment] is illegal" and further providing that "[ulpon presentation of such
petition the court may allow a writ of certiorari directed to the board of adjustment to
review such decision." SSZEA, supranote 3, § 7.
Each jurisdiction follows its own civil procedure as to the method of bringing such
an action; some retain the exact form of the Act, i.e., including the provision for such a
writ in the same code section as that providing for the board of adjustment, e.g., Louisiana, Missouri, New Mexico; others split it off into a separate code section, e.g., Iowa, New
Hampshire, Indiana; some recast it into a general provision for judicial review of all zoning
actions, e.g., Michigan, Kansas; and many jurisdictions have dropped the section altogether, relying on their administrative procedure statute, e.g., Illinois, or general provisions for review of administrative acts, e.g., California. Many jurisdictions have abolished
by statute the writ of certiorari, but the action remains in some form, whatever the name,
e.g., Colorado: "remedial writ;" Oregon: "writ of review." See APPENDix I infra for current
code citations of these and all subsequent statutory provisions.
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sion. It is also one of the few instances where the issue has been
squarely faced by the highest court of an American jurisdiction.
Nevertheless, the opinion is virtually devoid of conceptual
analysis and does not discuss the New York case law on civic
association standing.5 It completely ignores the case law of other
jurisdictions, and refers to federal case law only to the extent that
it relies heavily upon the concurring appellate division opinion of
Justice Hopkins.' The opinion is essentially a pragmatic one,
based on two major policy considerations. The first consideration
is the desire to see disputes over land use questions decided on
the merits instead of being shunted aside by the courts on procedural grounds. 7 The second is the belief that the economic disparity between land developers or speculators who seek zoning
changes to their advantage, and affected local individual owners
of developed property, can best be balanced by granting standing
to representative organizations which can spread the expense of
litigation among a number of owners. 8 The Court of Appeals observed that for courts to reject zoning challenges on standing
grounds, when the group bringing such challenges "represents
that segment of the public which stands to be most severely affected.

. .

is.

.

.an ironic situation which should not be permit-

ted to continue."9 Thus the New York Court of Appeals has come
full circle back to a rationale abandoned by the New York courts
over thirty years ago. 0
The court laid down factors for determining whether a particular organization should be granted standing. These were drawn
5. The court does not even indicate that such case law exists. For the special damages
rule (see note 25 infra and accompanying text), however, it cites as authority six New York
cases, all of which are civic association cases, without identifying them as such: Manor
Woods Ass'n v. Randol, 29 App. Div.2d 778, 287 N.Y.S.2d 734 (2d Dep't 1968); Moore v.
Burchell, 14 App. Div.2d 572, 218 N.Y.S.2d 868, motion for leave to appeal denied, 10
N.Y.2d 709, 223 N.Y.S.2d 1026, 179 N.E.2d 716 (1961); Lido Beach Civic Ass'n, Inc. v.
Board of Zoning Appeals, 13 App. Div.2d 1030, 217 N.Y.S.2d 364 (2d Dep't 1961); Feldman v. Nassau Shores Estates, 12 Misc.2d 607,172 N.Y.S.2d 769 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County
1958), aff'd, 7 App. Div.2d 757, 181 N.Y.S.2d 79 (2d Dep't 1958); Vitolo v. Chave, 63
Misc.2d 971, 314 N.Y.S.2d 51 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1970); Miller v. Incorporated
Village of East Hills, 41 Misc.2d 525, 245 N.Y.S.2d 718 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1963).
Douglaston Civic Ass'n, Inc. v. Galvin, 173 N.Y.L.J. 16, Jan. 23, 1975, at 6, col. 1 (N.Y.
Ct. of App. Dec. 20, 1974).
6. See notes 70-81 infra and accompanying text.
7. 173 N.Y.L.J. 16, Jan. 23, 1975, at 6, col. 1 (N.Y. Ct. of App. Dec. 20, 1974).
8. Id. at 6, cols. 1, 2.
9. Id. at 6, col. 2.
10. See note 35 infra and accompanying text.
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directly from Justice Hopkins' appellate division opinion, which

was itself based on Supreme Court pronouncements, and on the
recommendations of the A.L.I. Model Land Development Code."

The factors are:

2

(1) the capacity of the organization to assume an adversary
position, (2) the size and composition of the organization as
reflecting a position fairly representative of the community or
interests which it seeks to protect . . . (3) the adverse effect of
the decision sought to be reviewed on the group represented by
the organization as within the zone of interests sought to be
protected . . . [and (4)] full participating membership in the
representative organization be open to all residents and property owners in the relevant neighborhood.

The facts of the case are simple, and typical of the thousands
of urban/suburban zoning disputes which have flooded American
courts during the past generation. An owner of property in an
outlying residential area of Queens County, New York City,
zoned for single-family homes, applied to the Board of Standards

and Appeals for a variance to construct a six-story multiple dwelling. At the public hearing before the Board, the application was
opposed by residents of nearby homes and by the Douglaston
Civic Association, representing over 1000 such homeowners and

residents in the area-the classic confrontation between homeowners and apartment builders. The variance was granted, and
11. The opinion "invite[s] the Legislature's attention" to certain provisions of the
Code (173 N.Y.L.J. 16, Jan. 23, 1975, at 6, col. 3 n.4 (N.Y. Ct. of App. Dec. 20, 1974))
and cites other sections (Id. at 6, col. 2, col. 3 n.5) but does not give any of the specific
provisions or language of the Code. Since the opinion represents a judicial engrafting of
these cited provisions of the Model Land Development Code into the law of New York, a
virtual incorporation by reference of an unadopted statute into the case law, the full
provisions referred to by the Court are set out in APPFNDix II. The draft of a bill which
substantially embodies the ALI recommendations is in the process of being introduced in
the New York State Assembly as this issue of the HOFSTRA LAW REmVIw goes to press. The
bill, tentatively entitled "The Land Resource Management and Local Assistance Act,"
will be introduced by Assemblyman Herbert A. Posner (D. Queens), Chairman of the
Environmental Conservation Committee, and co-sponsors, and will probably undergo
public hearings by that committee during the spring of 1975. § 7-213 of the draft bill
embodies § 2-307 of the ALI Code, "Neighborhood Organizations," substantially unchanged. However, the following ALI provisions, all recommended to the legislature by
the Douglaston court, do not appear in the draft bill: § 9-103, "Persons Entitled to Initiate
Judicial Proceedings to Review Orders;" § 9-104, "Persons Entitled to Initiate Judicial
Proceedings to Review Rules and Ordinances;" and § 10-102, "Enforcement by Persons
Other than the Local Government."
12. 173 N.Y.L.J. 16, Jan. 23, 1975, at 6, col. 2 (N.Y. Ct. of App. Dec. 20, 1974).
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the homeowners and civic association sought judicial review of
the decision. 13 The lower court, valiantly flying in the face of over
twenty years of New York case law, granted the civic association
standing to seek review of the Board's decision, characterizing
previous holdings to the contrary in similar cases as "strained
attempt[s] to preserve technical perfection" which had the effect of "destroy[ing] the very purpose for which such.

. .

organ-

ization[s are] formed."' 4 The appellate division reversed on both
the merits and the standing issue, disposing of the latter in a onesentence reference to existing New York case law on the question.15 In a concurring opinion on the merits, Justice Hopkins
sharply disagreed with the majority on the standing issue, urging
that previous case law should no longer be controlling in view of
"the broadened concept of standing" in both New York and federal litigation. 6
Provisions for judicial review of administrative zoning decisions were included in the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act
drafted by a committee of eminent zoning authorities under the
auspices of the U.S. Department of Commerce in 1926:11
Any person or persons, jointly or severally, aggrieved by any
decision of the board of adjustment, or any taxpayer, or any
officer, department, board or bureau of the municipality may
present to a court of record a petition, duly verified, setting forth
that such decision is illegal, in whole or in part, specifying the
grounds of the illegality ....
13. There is a slight variation from the normal course of events in this case: instead
of a timely action for judicial review under the statute ("within thirty days after the filing
of the decision" N.Y.C. ADmiN. CODE § 668e-1.0(a) (1970), a standard provision of such
statutes generally), the plaintiffs' action was commenced three months later as a proceeding to review the Board's refusal to reopen and reconsider the granting of the variance
based on newly discovered evidence. The Court of Appeals ruled that the evidence in
question, concerning valuation of the land, was "at all times available" and therefore
could not constitute "substantial new evidence" under the Board's rules concerning the
granting of re-hearings. 173 N.Y.L.J. 16, Jan. 23, 1975, at 6, col. 3 (N.Y. Ct. of App. Dec.
20, 1974). Since this procedural issue on the merits is irrelevant to the issue of standing,
it will not be dealt with in this note.
14. Douglaston Civic Ass'n, Inc. v. Gavin [sic], 69 Misc.2d 686, 687-88, 330 N.Y.S.2d
810, 811 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1972).
15. Douglaston Civic Ass'n, Inc. v. Galvin, 43 App. Div.2d 739, 350 N.Y.S.2d 708, 709
(2d Dep't 1973).
16. Id. at 740, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 711 (Hopkins, J., concurring).
17. SSZEA, supra note 3, § 7.
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Upon the presentation of such petition the court may allow
a writ of certiorari directed to the board of adjustment to review
such decision ....

This venerable formulation, adopted by most American jurisdictions in the decades immediately following its release, remains the law today in one form or another in well over half of
them.18 While many variations in this language have been introduced over the past half century, no jurisdiction has gone so far
as to expressly grant by statute what Douglaston has done by
judicial fiat-standing to civic associations to initiate judicial
review of zoning determinations.'" The most consistent variation
18. Fourteen jurisdictions have adopted and still retain language virtually identical
to the Standard Act: Alaska, Delaware, Iowa, Maryland, Montana, Nebraska, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming & Texas.
Twelve have provisions which differ only by elimination of the words "or any taxpayer":
Alabama, Louisiana, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York & North Dakota;
(Board of County Commissioners acting as a board of zoning appeals), Puerto Rico, Rhode
Island, Utah, Virgin Islands, & West Virginia. Four jurisdictions have adopted variations
of the phrase "persons aggrieved": Georgia: "who may have a substantial interest"; Michigan: "any party aggrieved"; Ohio: "adversely affected"; Vermont: "an interested person." Three add seemingly broader language to the standard phrase: Connecticut: "or any
person owning land which abuts the land involved in any decision of said board"; Indiana:
"firm or corporation;" Massachusetts: "whether or not a party to the proceeding." In six
jurisdictions there is no specific provision for judicial review, it being left to general
certiorari proceedings in review of administrative actions: Arizona, Colorado, Florida,
Kentucky, Minnesota & Tennessee. Three jurisdictions specifically refer such judicial
review of zoning decisions to their administrative procedure acts: California, Hawaii &
Illinois. Three provide a separate statute for review of all zoning decisions: Kansas, Nevada & New Jersey. Five jurisdictions have totally non-standard provisions: Arkansas: "in
case of abuse the adjoining property owners shall have the right to appeal to the courts";
Maine: "An appeal may be taken... [by whom?]. But see Whiting v. Seavey, 159 Me.
61, 188 A.2d 276 (1963): "irrespective of whether a zoning ordinance contained an appeal
provision or not a citizen believing himself aggrieved by a decision of a Board of Appeals
should have a statutory right of review." (emphasis added); North Carolina: "Each decision by the board [of adjustment] is subject to review by the supreme court" [by
whom?]; Oregon: "A party aggrieved or any person to whom notice of the hearing was
sent" [which includes 'other interested persons']-but "writ of review" referred to applies only to "any party to any proceeding"; Washington: "The original applicant or an
adverse party." Two jurisdictions have no board of appeals to review: Idaho and Mississippi. See APPENDLX I infra for current code citations of statutory provisions.
19. The District of Columbia has come the closest. Its zoning statute expressly confers standing on civic associations to appear before the board of appeals in the original
administrative hearing: "Appeals to the board of adjustment may be taken by any person
aggrieved or organization authorized to represent such person . . . . No citizens' associa-

tion or association created for civic purposes and not for profit shall be required to pay
said fee [for appeal]". D.C. CODE ENCYCL. ANN. § 5-420 (1966). Based on this language,
its courts have had no difficulty in granting a civic association standing to pursue the next
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has been to eliminate the phrase "or any taxpayer," language
which would seem to confer broad authority for citizen standing
over and above judicially imposed standards. Some commentators concede that this phrase could be read to confer standing on
virtually any individual in the community, whether the drafters
of the Act intended that result or not.2" There seems to be no
uniformity in the cases, however, indicating that those jurisdictions which retain the words are necessarily more liberal in granting standing to third parties to zoning disputes than those which
have eliminated the language.2"
New York is one of those jurisdictions which has retained,
virtually intact, the wording and form of the Standard Act, but
has eliminated the phrase "or any taxpayer," both in the statute
upon which the action in Douglaston is based 2 and in the other
stage, judicial review of the decision to which the association had been a party. Selden v.
Capitol Hill Southeast Citizens' Ass'n, 219 F.2d 33 (D.C. Cir. 1955). Absent such statutory
provisions, failure of an association to be a party to the hearing below has been a problem
to most courts, even where local boards generously allowed their representatives to be
heard. See note 57 infra and accompanying text.
20. See Ayer, The Primitive Law of Standing in Land Use Disputes: Some Notes
From a Dark Continent, 55 IowA L. REv. 344, 347 (1969); R. ANDERSON, AME=mAN LAW OF
ZONING § 21.06 (1968).
21. See, e.g., Pattison v. Corby, 226 Md. 97, 101, 172 A.2d 490, 492 (1961), in which
the Maryland court speaks of "the absence of a statute creating a private right as a
taxpayer," even though the review provision under which it is operating does retain the
language "or any taxpayer." MD. ANN. CODE, art. 66B § 4.08 (1970). The Maryland courts
have consistently been among the most rigid in enforcing the special damage rule, (see
note 25 infra and accompanying text) and have been among the few to enunciate a firm
no-standing rule on associations: "[A]n association or corporate body representing only
the viewpoint of its members is not itself aggrieved merely because its members are." City
of Greenbelt v. Jaeger, 237 Md. 456, 206 A.2d 694, 698 (1965). While this case concerned
a municipal corporation, the Maryland courts have consistently applied the same rule to
civic associations; See Southland Hills Improvement Ass'n v. Raine, 220 Md. 213, 151
A.2d 734 (1959); Norwood Heights Improvement Ass'n, Inc. v. Mayor and City Council
of Baltimore, 195 Md. 1, 72 A.2d 1 (1950); Windsor Hills Improvement Ass'n v. Mayor
and City Council of Baltimore, 195 Md. 383, 73 A.2d 531, 535 (1950). In the latter case
the court pointed out that not only was a civic association not a property owner, but
neither was it a taxpayer in its own right, and so could not qualify under the "or any
taxpayer" language. See also Renard v. Dade County, 61 So.2d 832 (Fla. 1972) reaffirming
the special damage rule in the face of the statute then in force, FLA. STAT. ANN. § § 176.16
and 176.17, which retained the language "or any taxpayer." The statute has since been
repealed, Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-129 § 5. For a case drawing a clear distinction between
"persons aggrieved" and "taxpayer," and holding that where a statute grants standing to
both, the taxpayer plaintiff need not prove aggrievement under the special damages rule,
see Scott v. Board of Adjustment, 405 S.W.2d 55 (Tex. 1966). However, the plaintiffs in
that case were individual taxpayers, not joined in an association.
22. N.Y.C. CHAmmR
& ADMiN. CODE § 668e-1.0a (1972).
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provisions of New York law concerning judicial review of decisions of boards of appeal.2s Thus in New York, as in most other
jurisdictions, the focus of the case law has been upon the legal
implications of the phrase "person or persons, jointly or severally,
aggrieved. 12 Out of this language has evolved the rule of special
damages,25' which the court in Douglastonstated as requiring that
"for a person to be 'aggrieved' . . . there must be a showing that
the person has been personally and adversely affected by the
administrative determination. 21 1 This "personally and adversely
affected" test represents language which has been hammered out
and refined by the New York courts for some thirty-five years,
and which has not always had the same meaning. For many years
the New York courts insisted that in order for a plaintiff to be

considered aggrieved, a showing had to be made of his specific,
personal and legal interest in the subject matter as distinguished

from a general interest such as that shown by all members of the
community.? In addition, pecuniary damage or economic loss
has, until very recently, been considered vital to such a showing,2
and the ownership of property in the affected area was in turn an
essential element of a showing of such damage or loss. 29 In brief,
23. N.Y. GEN. Crrv LAW §§ 38, 82 (McKinney 1968); N.Y. VM.GE LAw § 7-712, subd.
3 (McKinney 1973); N.Y. TowN LAW §§ 267, subds. 2, 7 & 282 (McKinney 1965).
24. Some jurisdictions have simplified the phrase, e.g., Alabama: "party aggrieved";
Michigan: "party aggrieved"; New Hampshire: "person aggrieved." Others have subsitituted similar language, such as "person adversely affected" (Ohio); "any person having
an interest in property affected" (Kansas); "Any person or persons who may have a
substantial interest in any decision" (Georgia). The Georgia courts have made it clear that
as far as they are concerned "substantial interest . . . is synonymous with the word
'aggrieved' used as descriptive of those entitled to appeal in similar statutes of other
jurisdictions," and have gone on to apply the special damages rule as strictly as any court.
Victoria Corp. v. Atlanta Merchandise Mart, 101 Ga. App. 163, 112 S.E.2d 793, 795 (1960).
'See APPENDIX I infra for current code citations of statutory provisions.
25. See 2 A. RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING §§ 63-1 to -39 (3d ed. 1972);
3 R. ANDERSON, AAiERICAN LAw OF ZONING § 21.02 (1968); 2 E. YoKLEY, ZONING LAw AND
PRACTICE § 18-3 (3d ed. 1965); 2 J. MrZENBAUM, THE LAw OF ZONING § 1020-35 (2d ed.
1955).
26. 173 N.Y.L.J. 16, Jan. 23, 1975, at 6, col. 1 (N.Y. Ct. of App. Dec. 20, 1974).
27. See, e.g., Hattem v. Silver, 19 Misc.2d 1091, 190 N.Y.S.2d 752 (Sup. Ct. Nassau
County 1959); Downey v. Incorporated Village of Ardsley, 152 N.Y.S.2d 195 (Sup. Ct.
Westchester County 1956), aff'd, 3 App. Div.2d 663, 158 N.Y.S.2d 306 (2d Dep't 1957);
Blumberg v. Hill, 119 N.Y.S.2d 855 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1953).
28. See, e.g., Marcus v. Village of Mamaroneck, 283 N.Y. 325, 28 N.E.2d 856 (1940);
Brechner v. Incorporated Village of Lake Success, 23 Misc.2d 159, 201 N.Y.S.2d 254 (Sup.
Ct. Nassau County 1960).
29. See, e.g., Wood v. Freeman, 43 Misc.2d 616, 251 N.Y.S.2d 996 (Sup. Ct. Nassau
County 1964), afl'd, 24 App. Div.2d 704, 262 N.Y.S.2d 431 (2d Dep't 1965).
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only one who owned property was deemed to be in a position to
suffer possible economic harm from alleged damage to that property by the action of the appeals board.
Herein lies the crux of the legal problem facing the civic
association" which wishes to challenge the action of board of
appeals which it believes will adversely affect its members. By
definition, a civic association usually owns no property of its
own3 ' but rather acts as a representative of its property-owning
30. Courts use the terms "civic association," "neighborhood association," "property
owners' association," "home-owners' association," "residents' association," etc. virtually
interchangeably, depending on the particular plaintiff, while rarely defining the nature
of the entity. Courts occasionally quote from the by-laws of the association to indicate its
function, as: "to promote the health and general welfare of the residents. . . and to foster
a sense of civic responsibility among all persons interested in [the community]." Lido
Beach Civic Ass'n, Inc. v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 13 App. Div.2d 1030, 1031, 217
N.Y.S.2d 364, 365 (2d Dep't 1961). See also Garden Dist. Property Owners Ass'n, Inc. v.
City of New Orleans, 98 So.2d 922 (La. App. 1957). But see Amherst Growth Study
Committee, Inc. v. Board of Appeals, 296 N.E.2d 717, 718 (Mass. App. 1973), wherein the
court said: "A statement of corporate purposes cannot by itself create standing." By far
the most detailed discussion of the nature of such associations occurs in Douglaston itself,
at all three levels of adjudication. In his opinion in the lower court, New York Supreme
Court Justice Moses Weinstein describes the association as "a representative of its members who are owners of property in proximity to the subject land. . . . [and] a medium
through which their common rights might be preserved equally for all . . . . united to
attain the political and economic power consonant with one voice speaking the thoughts
and protecting the rights of many"-"an instrument by which. . . property owners...
may advance their common interest. . . ." Douglaston Civic Ass'n, Inc. v. Gavin, [sic]
69 Misc.2d 686, 687-88, 330 N.Y.S.2d 810, 811-12 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1972). Judge
Hopkins in his concurring Appellate Division opinion describes it as "an organization of
over 1000 property owners and residents in the immediate vicinity of the area for which
the variance has been granted," and goes on to analyze its ability to "fairly represent.. .
the community or interests which it seeks to protect" in terms of recent Supreme Court
pronouncements on standing. Douglaston Civic Ass'n, Inc. v. Galvin, 43 App.Div.2d 739,
740-41, 350 N.Y.S.2d 708, 711 (2d Dep't 1973)(Hopkins, J., concurring). The Court of
Appeals decision by Judge Jasen defines "an appropriate representative association" as
one which wishes "to assert rights of the individual members . . . where such persons may
be affected by a rezoning, variance or an exception determination of a zoning board,"
Douglaston Civic Ass'n, Inc. v. Galvin, 173 N.Y.L.J. 16, Jan. 23, 1975, at 6, col. 2 (N.Y.
Ct. of App. Dec. 20, 1974). The one characteristic all such organizations have in common,
regardless of name or form (unincorporated association or corporation), is that while they
represent property owners, they themselves do not own any property. For the sake of
uniformity, then, the term "civic association" is used throughout, to denote an association, whether incorporated or not, of residents and property-owners of a particular area,
itself owning no property, and purporting to represent its members in seeking judicial
review of municipal zoning decisions allegedly affecting their property or legal interests.
31. For the rare case where a court grants standing to a civic association because it
does own property in the area, see Shore Acres Improvement Ass'n v. Anne Arundel
County Bd. of Appeals, 251 Md. 310, 247 A.2d 402 (Md. App. 1968). The association lost
on the merits, however, due to strict application of the special damages rule.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol3/iss3/10

8

Joseph: Douglaston Civic Association, Inc. v. Galvin

Civic Association Standing

members. Indeed, the reaction of the New York courts in the
dozen or so civic association cases which have been reported in
the last two decades, has been very simply: no property ownership = no aggrieved party = no standing. The proposition has
seemed so self-evident to some courts that they have enunciated
the rule without elaboration or citation; 2 then, in bootstrap fashion, later courts have cited these cases for the proposition. 3
New York case law on the subject, however, began on quite
a different tack. In a 1952 lower court decision, North Shore
Beach Property Owners Association v. Town of Brookhaven,34 the
court disposed of the standing issue with ease by relying on
Neponsit Property Owners Association, Inc. v. Emigrant Industrial Savings Bank,3" and allowed a civic association to bring
a temporary injunction declaring invalid an amendment to a zoning ordinance. Neponsit, a 1938 Court of Appeals decision, has
become the leading case for the proposition that a corporation
acting as representative of property owners has the right to enforce, in equity, restrictive covenants of which it is the assignee,
even though it cannot satisfy the common law rules of privity of
estate because it does not itself own the property with which the
covenants run. That the same principle of corporate enforcement
of common property rights should logically carry over into the
zoning arena was a proposition so self-evident to the court in
North Shore Beach that it did not even bother to enunciate it as
a point of law.:6 When the same case came before the same court
not considon the merits two years later, the issue of standing was
37
decision.
the
in
mention
to
ered important enough
It is true that the two North Shore Beach decisions did not
concern the standing of aggrieved persons before a board of ap32. See Manor Woods Ass'n v. Randol, 29 App. Div.2d 778, 287 N.Y.S.2d 734 (2d
Dep't 1968); Lido Beach Civic Ass'n v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 13 App. Div.2d 1030,
217 N.Y.S.2d 364 (2d Dep't 1961).
33. Vitolo v. Chave, 63 Misc.2d 971, 314 N.Y.S.2d 51 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1970);
Mueller v. Anderson, 60 Misc.2d 568, 303 N.Y.S.2d 143 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1969);
Miller v. Incorporated Village of East Hills, 41 Misc.2d 525, 245 N.Y.S.2d 718 (Sup. Ct.
Nassau County 1963).
34. 115 N.Y.S.2d 670 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1952).
35. 278 N.Y. 248, 15 N.E.2d 793 (1938).
36. North Shore Beach Property Owners' Ass'n v. Town of Brookhaven, 115 N.Y.S.2d
670, 673 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1952).
37. North Shore Beach Property Owners' Ass'n v. Town of Brookhaven, 129 N.Y.S.2d
697 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1954), aff 'd, 1 App. Div.2d 1043, 153 N.Y.S.2d 579 (2d Dep't
1954).
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peals, but rather standing to challenge the validity of zoning
amendments enacted by a legislature, under a statute which provides for no specific form of judicial review.38 Furthermore, these
decisions involved injunctive and declaratory judgment actions
rather than a writ of certiorari." Perhaps these distinctions of
form obscured the issues and prevented courts from drawing parallels to them. It is interesting to note however, that while the
Neponsit rationale lay dormant in New York for over twenty
years, other jurisdictions, .untroubled by such procedural problems, applied the reasoning to zoning cases long before
Douglaston.0 The court in Neponsit said:4"
Only blind adherence to an ancient formula. . . could constrain
the court to hold that a corporation formed as a medium for the
enjoyment of common rights of property owners owns no property which would benefit by enforcement of common
rights ...
While this language was addressed to enforcement of private covenants as "common rights", other courts have construed them far
more broadly to apply to enforcement of public zoning restrictions as "common rights."4 The New York courts have, curiously,
ignored the North Shore Beach cases and their reliance on
Neponsit, without expressly overruling them, and have gone off
on a different tack entirely. It was not until the lower court decision in Douglaston that the rationale was resurrected and
Neponsit dusted off and cited for its broad language in support
of ignoring the corporate form in enforcement of common property rights.43 In 1953, just one year after the first North Shore
38. N.Y. TOwN LAw § 265 (McKinney 1965).
39. Note, however, that the New York courts have since held that the criteria for
standing to maintain an article 78 proceeding are the same as for maintaining a declaratory judgment action. Blumberg v. City of Yonkers, 21 App. Div.2d 886, 251 N.Y.S.2d 750
(2d Dep't 1964), aff'd, 15 N.Y.2d 791, 205 N.E.2d 686, 257 N.Y.S.2d 589 (1965); Haber v.
Board of Estimate, 33 App. Div.2d 571, 305 N.Y.S.2d 520 (2d Dep't 1969); Unitarian
Universalist Church v. Shorten, 64 Misc.2d 1027, 316 N.Y.S.2d 837 (Sup. Ct. Nassau
County 1970).
40. See, e.g., Garden Dist. Property Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. City of New Orleans, 98
So.2d 922 (La. App. 1957).
41. Neponsit Property Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. Emigrant Industrial Savings Bank, 278
N.Y. 248, 262, 15 N.E.2d 793, 798 (1938).
42. Garden Dist. Property Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. City of New Orleans, 98 So.2d 922
(La. App. 1957).
43. Douglaston Civic Ass'n, Inc. v. Gavin, [sic] 69 Misc.2d 686, 688, 330 N.Y.S.2d
810, 812 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1972).
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Beach decision, a New York lower court in the neighboring suburban county of Nassau undertook to analyze the problem on a
more conceptual level and, in Property Owners Association of
Garden City Estates, Inc. v. Board of Zoning Appeals of the Inc.
Village of Garden City,44 denied standing to a civic association
without mentioning either North Shore Beach or Neponsit. There

the court relied on a 1942 case, Browning v. Bryant,45 in which
residents of one village, whose property adjoined the situs of a
zoning change in a neighboring village, attempted to obtain review of the latter village's determination. Browning was not decided on the special damages theory, i.e., that the petitioners'
lack of property ownership within the enacting village precluded
them from showing the economic harm from the village's action
necessary to achieve status of an aggrieved person. Instead, relying on a nineteenth century case of dubious relevance, 4 the court
based its decision on the concept that since the jurisdiction of a
village government is "confined to property and persons within
[its] territorial limits . . . no interest of [plaintiffs] could be

the subject of adjudication by the board.

' 47

Thus Browning was

what one commentator has dubbed a "boundary case"

8

rather

than either a civic association or special damages case, and it is
clear that the conceptual basis of its decision was jurisdictional

rather than based on the special damages theory. Nevertheless,
later New York civic association cases, which invariably use the
44. 2 Misc.2d 309, 123 N.Y.S.2d 716 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1953).
45. 178 Misc. 576, 34 N.Y.S.2d 280 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County), af'd, 264 App. Div.2d
777, 34 N.Y.S.2d 729 (2d Dep't 1942).
46. People ex rel. Steward v. Board of Ry. Comm'rs, 160 N.Y. 202, 54 N.E. 697 (1899).
47. 178 Misc. 576, 577, 34 N.Y.S.2d 280, 281 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1942).
48. Ayer, The Primitive Law of Standing in Land Use Disputes: Some Notes From a
Dark Continent, 55 IowA L. REv. 344, 356 (1969). The author erroneously describes the
case as holding that since the jurisdiction of "township trustees" is limited to the town
outside the village, residents of a village could not review their decision, Id. at 357.
Actually the case concerned an action by residents of one incorporated village, Kings
Point, against the Board of Trustees of a neighboring incorporated village, Great Neck,
both located within the Town (not "township") of North Hempstead, whose Town Board,
consisting of Councilmen (not "trustees") had no zoning jurisdiction whatsoever over
either village and was not a party to the case. For an interesting parallel to the facts which
Professor Ayer wrongly ascribes to Browning, see Town of North Hempstead v. Village of
North Hills, 355 N.Y.S.2d 940 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1974), aff'd, 172 N.Y.L.J. 107,
Dec. 4, 1974, at 19, col. 3 (2d Dep't), in which the same town in which Browningtook place
is denied standing to challenge a zoning amendment made by one of the incorporated
villages within its boundaries, interpreting N.Y. VRLAGE LAW § 7-706 (McKinney 1973).
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no property = no person aggrieved = no standing argument, 4
persist in citing Garden City Estates as a leading case for the
proposition that since a civic association owns no property of its
own which can be harmed, it cannot therefore be an aggrieved
person. 0 Such reliance represents a kind of second level bootstrapping, since Garden City Estates does not relate the plaintiffs' lack of property ownership to the special damages rule. It
simply cites Browning which, as has been indicated, is based on
an entirely different conceptual framework."1
Bayport Civic Association v. Koehler" was decided in 1954,
the same year as the second North Shore Beach decision, by the
same court but a different judge, and one year after Garden City
Estates. The court dodged the standing issue by stating that
while it was "doubtful" whether the civic association plaintiff
was aggrieved within the meaning of the statute, the question was
"academic" because there remained other individual petitioners
joined as parties who could be deemed aggrieved." The case is
more notable for its early attempt to broaden the special damages
rule by including "nearby residents" in the class of persons aggrieved, 4 and for its tentative proposal of a "standing-by-waiver"
rule. This rule stated first, that if an applicant before a zoning
49. See, e.g., Moore v. Burchell, 14 App. Div.2d 572, 218 N.Y.S.2d 868, motion for
leave to appeal denied, 10 N.Y.2d 709, 223 N.Y.S.2d 1026, 179 N.E.2d 716 (1961).
50. See, e.g., Vitolo v. Chave, 63 Misc.2d 971, 314 N.Y.S.2d 51 (Sup. Ct. Nassau
County 1970); Miller v. Incorporated Village of East Hills, 41 Misc.2d 525, 245 N.Y.S.2d
718 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1963); Feldman v. Nassau Shores Estates, 12 Misc.2d 607,
172 N.Y.S.2d 769 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1958).
51. The rule enunciated in Browning endured in New YO-. Ior many years. See, e.g.,
Town of Huntington v. Town Bd., 57 Misc.2d 821. 9-'5 N.Y.S.2d 558 (Sup. Ct. Nassau
County 1968); Village of Russell Gardens v. F
of Zoning Appeals, 30 Misc.2d 392, 219
N.Y.S.2d 501 (Sup. Ct. Nassau Count,, 1961); Wood v. Freeman, 43 Misc.2d 616, 251
N.Y.S.2d 996 (Sup. Ct. Nassau Coury 1964), afi'd, 24 App. Div.2d 704, 262 N.Y.S.2d 431
(2d Dep't 1965). It is important t', note, however, that by the time the Court of Appeals
reached the civic association question in Douglaston, the Browning rule had been overturned. Thus it was by then no longer the law that persons who own property in one
jurisdiction are precluded from showing themselves aggrieved by zoning determinations
of adjoining jurisdictions, even if their property abuts the situs. See Bloom v. Town Bd,,
41 App. Div.2d 533, 339 N.Y.S.2d 264 (2d Dep't 1973) (dissenting opinion), rev'd on
dissenting opinion, 32 N.Y.2d 930, 300 N.E.2d 730, 347 N.Y.S.2d 197 (1973). See also
Township of River Vale v. Town of Orangetown, 403 F.2d 684 (2d Cir. 1968); Town of
Bedford v. Village of Mt. Kisco, 40 App. Div.2d 979, 338 N.Y.S.2d 447 (2d Dep't 1972),
aff'd, 33 N.Y.2d 178, 351 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1973).
52. 138 N.Y.S.2d 524 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1954).
53. Id. at 529.
54. Id. at 530.
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board believes any person appearing in opposition is not a person
aggrieved, he must make an objection and have it ruled upon by

the board or it is deemed waived; and second, if the board sees
fit to hear the party in opposition on the merits, its assumption
of jurisdiction cannot be interfered with by the courts unless it is
shown to be unreasonable or arbitrary.-' The first suggestion for
liberalization of standing was premature,56 while the second has
never gained approval. The liberality of local boards in allowing
parties to be heard has not influenced reviewing courts as to the

standing of such parties to bring legal actions. 7

For some fifteen years following these early 1950's cases, the

New York decisions prosaically followed the rationale, by now
well established, that civic associations' lack of property ownership precludes them from attaining standing as aggrieved per-

sons, with no court apparently interested enough in the question
to attempt a conceptual analysis.58 The Court of Appeals considered the issue only once during these years, in 1961, when it
affirmed, without opinion, Point Lookout Civic Association v.

Town of Hempstead,59 in which a civic association was denied
standing to declare a town zoning amendment invalid.
55. Id. at 530-31.
56. See, e.g., Albright v. Town of Manlius, 34 App. Div.2d 419, 312 N.Y.S.2d 13 (4th
Dep't 1970); Daum v. Meade, 35 App. Div.2d 598, 313 N.Y.S.2d 625 (2d Dep't 1970); Elle
v. Neenan, 68 Misc.2d 725, 327 N.Y.S.2d 706 (Sup. Ct. Ontario County 1972); Horan v.
Board of Appeals, 6 Misc.2d 571, 164 N.Y.S.2d 543 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1957).
57. See, e.g. Vitolo v. Chave, 63 Misc.2d 971, 314 N.Y.S.2d 51 (Sup. Ct. Nassau
County 1970). There, citing eight previous New York civic association cases, the court
stated that neither it nor the local board of appeals could broaden the definition of persons
aggrieved, that being a matter for the legislature. The court also made an important
conceptual observation: "absence of standing goes to the capacity of a party rather than
the jurisdiction of the Board over the parties or the subject matter ...
" Id. at 972, 314
N.Y.S.2d at 55.
58. Miller v. Dassler, 1 App. Div.2d 975 (2d Dep't 1956); Feldman v. Nassau Shores
Estates, 12 Misc.2d 607, 172 N.Y.S.2d 769 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County), aff'd, 7 App. Div.2d
757 (2d Dep't 1958); Point Lookout Civic Ass'n v. Town of Hempstead, 22 Misc.2d 757,
200 N.Y.S.2d 925 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1960), aff'd, 12 App. Div.2d 505 (2d Dep't),
aff'd, 9 N.Y.2d 961, 176 N.E.2d 203, 217 N.Y.S.2d 227 (1961); Lido Beach Civic Ass'n,
Inc. v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 13 App. Div.2d 1030, 217 N.Y.S.2d 364 (2d Dep't 1961);
Moore v. Burchell, 14 App. Div.2d 572, 218 N.Y.S.2d 868, motion for leave to appeal
denied, 10 N.Y.2d 709, 179 N.E.2d 716, 223 N.Y.S.2d 1026 (1961); Miller v. Incorporated
Village of East Hills, 41 Misc.2d 525, 245 N.Y.S.2d 718 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1963);
Manor Woods Ass'n v. Randol, 29 App. Div.2d 778, 287 N.Y.S.2d 734 (2d Dep't 1968);
Mueller v. Anderson, 60 Misc.2d 568, 303 N.Y.S.2d 143 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1969);
Vitolo v. Chave, 63 Misc.2d 971, 314 N.Y.S.2d 51 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1970).
59. 22 Misc.2d 757, 200 N.Y.S.2d 925 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1960), afl'd, 12 App.
Div.2d 505 (2d Dep't), aff'd, 9 N.Y.2d 961, 176 N.E.2d 203, 217 N.Y.S.2d 227 (1961).
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In the fourteen years between Point Lookout and
Douglaston, the rules of standing became greatly liberalized, not
only in federal case law and in the New York non-zoning cases
cited in Douglastonitself,6" but in New York zoning law generally.
The "boundary rule" was overturned by the Court of Appeals in
1973,61 and in the very same case, Bloom v. Town Board of Town

of Oyster Bay,"2 the pecuniary damage corollary of the special
damages rule, after several years of erosion in the lower courts,"
was laid to rest once and for all.64 By the time the New York Court
of Appeals was confronted with the 1974 Douglaston Appellate
Division decision, enunciating the by now traditional civic association corollary to the same rule, it decided that the time had
come to complete the cycle and retire this outmoded formula as
well. In one sense, Douglaston was a poor case for this purpose,
since the plaintiffs' argument on the merits was so weak as to
render victory on the standing issue a hollow one.65 On the other
hand, it was a good case because of Judge Hopkins' fine concurring opinion seeking to liberalize the standing test. The Court of
Appeals seized the opportunity to finally enunciate a new rule on
the standing of civic associations, with a broad holding expressly
directed not only to all proceedings against appeals boards covered by relevant New York statutes, but also to "other similar
zoning provisions"" and "rezoning, variance or . . . exception

determination of a zoning board." 7 In view of this broad lan60. National Org'n for Women v. State Div. of Human Rights, 34 N.Y.2d 416, 314
N.E.2d 867, 358 N.Y.S.2d 124 (1974); Glen Cove Mun. Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Glen Cove
NAACP, 34 App. Div.2d 956, 312 N.Y.S.2d 400 (2d Dep't 1970); American Jewish Congress v. Carter, 19 Misc.2d 205, 190 N.Y.S.2d 218 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), modified on
othergrounds, 10 App. Div.2d 833, 199 N.Y.S.2d 157 (1st Dep't), aff'd, 9 N.Y.2d 223, 173
N.E.2d 788, 213 N.Y.S.2d 60 (1961). Douglaston Civic Ass'n, Inc. v. Galvin, 173 N.Y.L.J.
16, Jan. 23, 1975, at 6, col. 1 (N.Y. Ct. of App. Dec. 20, 1974).
61. See note 51 supra.
62. Bloom v. Town Bd., 41 App. Div.2d 533, 339 N.Y.S.2d 264 (2d Dep't 1973)(dissenting opinion), rev'd on dissentingopinion, 32 N.Y.2d 930,300 N.E.2d 730, 347 N.Y.S.2d
197 (1973).
63. See cases cited in note 56 supra; see also Antrobus v. Board of Zoning Appeals,
43 App. Div.2d 705, 349 N.Y.S.2d 798 (2d Dep't 1973); Daum v. Meade, 35 App. Div.2d
598, 313 N.Y.S.2d 625 (2d Dep't 1970); Levien v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 64 Misc.2d
40, 313 N.Y.S.2d 909 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1970).
64. "I do not feel, however, that pecuniary damage is the sine qua non for standing
, The litigant need only show that somehow he or his property is especially 'affected'
or 'aggrieved'.

. . ."

41 App. Div.2d 533, 534, 339 N.Y.S.2d 264, 266 (2d Dep't 1973).

65. See note 13 supra.
66. 173 N.Y.L.J. 16, Jan. 23, 1975, at 6, col. 3, n.2 (N.Y. Ct. of App. Dec. 20, 1974).
67. Id. at 6, col. 2.
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guage, plus the use of the words "rezoning" and "zoning board"
' '6
rather than simply "variance" and "board of appeals, 8 it must
be concluded that the Court of Appeals, rather than limit its
holding to the narrower issue of who may be a person aggrieved
under specific statutes, intended to extend its new civic association standing rule to actions challenging legislative as well as
administrative zoning decisions. 9 Thus it may be inferred that
the new rule will enable qualifying civic associations to challenge
original zoning enactments and amendments to existing zoning
ordinances promulgated by legislative bodies, as well as variances, special exceptions, conditional use permits, and similar
rulings by administrative boards and officials.
While nowhere in the decision does the court mention the
important United States Supreme Court cases greatly expanding
the concept of citizen standing, it clearly indicates its indebtedness to this line of decisions when it discusses whether the Douglaston Civic Association satisfies the criteria it had itself laid
down for standing. By finding that the Association "establishes
its ability to undertake an adversary position and to represent
adequately the 'aggrieved' neighborhood members of the organization,"o the court firmly places the case within the rubric of
Baker v. Carr' and Flast v. Cohen.7 2 In Baker, the "gist of the
question of standing" was framed as to whether the litigant has
"such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation
of issues upon which the court so largely depends"; 73 Flastrelated
the question of standing "to whether the dispute sought to be
68. "Rezoning" is a legislative act done by village boards of trustees and town and
city councils, in which case it could be said that they are acting in the capacity of "zoning
boards." Note also that the standing criteria for bringing a declaratory judgment action
to test a legislative act has been held to be equal to that required to bring an article 78
proceeding against an administrative act. See note 39 supra.This factor tends to reinforce
the view that the court's holding is intended to apply to both, although the facts of the
case concern only a certiorari action against an administrative act.
69. This analysis seems bolstered by the court's observation that it is "intrigued" by
the avoidance altogether of the term "aggrieved person" by the A.L.I. MODEL LAND DEVEL-

which it sees as "obviat[ing] the need for frequent litigation of this often
perplexing question." 173 N.Y.L.J. 16, Jan. 23, 1975, at 6, col. 3, n.5 (N.Y. Ct. of App.
Dec. 20, 1974).
70. Id. at 6, col. 2.
71. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
OPMENT CODE,

72. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).

73. 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
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adjudicated will be presented in an adversary context." 4 The
Douglaston court left no doubt as to where its constitutional underpinnings lay when it stated that it can hardly be questioned
that the effect of the variance on the association "is within the
' ' This language was drawn
zone of interests to be protected."75
from, although not attributed to, the landmark case of
Association of Data ProcessingService Organizationsv. Camp,"
which spoke of the "enlargement of the class of people who may
protest administrative action" and "[t]he
whole drive for enlarg'77
ing the category of aggrieved 'persons'.
Justice Hopkins in his concurring appellate division opinion,
upon which the Court of Appeals essentially based its decision,
referred to this line of federal cases, citing Data Processing and
the environmental case popularly known as "Mineral King." 8 He
cited the latter for the proposition that "[the] interest [sought
to be protected by the complainant] need not be solely economic;
'7
'it may represent aesthetic and environmental values as well.
This language serves to drive a few more nails into the coffin of
the pecuniary damages rule, while the reference to "Mineral
King" tends to call to mind the broad language on standing in
that case. There the Supreme Court observed that the trend of
cases had been towards recognizing that "injuries other than economic harm are sufficient to bring a person within the meaning
of the statutory language ['A person . . . adversely affected or
aggrieved by agency action . . . is entitled to judicial review

thereof'8 ]."' It also noted the shift "towards discarding the notion that an injury that is widely shared is ipso facto not an injury
sufficient to provide the basis for judicial review."8 Obviously
New York's traditional special damages rule in zoning litigation
would have difficulty passing muster under these Supreme Court
formulations. However, the Court of Appeals did not pick up
Justice Hopkins' reference to "Mineral King," and Douglaston
does not involve environmental issues. New York courts have
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
711 (2d
80.
81.

392 U.S. 83, 101 (1968).
173 N.Y.L.J. 16, Jan. 23, 1975, at 6, col. 2 (N.Y. Ct. of App. Dec. 20, 1974).
397 U.S. 150 (1970).
Id. at 154.
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
Douglaston Civic Ass'n, Inc. v. Galvin, 43 App. Div.2d 739, 740, 350 N.Y.S.2d 708,
Dep't 1973) (Hopkins, J., concurring).
Administrative Procedure Act § 10, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970).
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 738 (1972).
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been loathe to draw parallels between environmental and zoning
litigation, even though they are both aspects of land use planning
2
in the broadest sense.1

Thus with this decision New York joins the handful of Ameri-

can jurisdictions which have granted standing to civic associations to challenge municipal zoning decisions.8 By so doing, its
highest court becomes one of the first in the country to apply
contemporary Supreme Court doctrine on standing in general to
the issue of standing in municipal zoning litigation, and to apply

the latest American Law Institute recommendations on the subject. It is hoped that courts throughout New York will follow

Douglaston, as interpreted in this casenote, liberally, and that
other jurisdictions, either by legislation or judicial decision, will
soon afford their citizens the same opportunity to correct the
economic disparity between individual property owners and land

developers in land use disputes. 4 Now that the Court of Appeals
82. The Court of Appeals may be faced with this issue very soon. Just six weeks prior
to its decision in Douglaston, Judge John Scileppi, retired from that court after a dozen
years' service and sitting by designation in Suffolk County Supreme Court, rendered a
decision in O'Brien v. Barnes Building Co., Inc., Index #74-1227 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County
Nov. 6, 1974) which granted standing to a group of 700 homeowners challenging an administrative determination under New York's new Tidal Wetlands Act (N.Y. ENVmRONwMENAL
CONSERVATION LAW § 25) (McKinney Supp. 1974) relying heavily on both "Mineral King"
and "S.C.R.A.P." (United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures,
412 U.S. 669 (1973)). Judge Scileppi brushed aside the obvious problem posed by New
York's long case law history on civic association standing with the observation, concerning
economic damages, that "rules for standing to sue evolved through cases involving zoning
questions, and the rules are not the same for standing to sue in conservation or ecology
cases." If this decision should reach the Court of Appeals, it must be assumed that in light
of Douglaston, it would be upheld on the standing issue thus harmonizing New York law
on standing in both the zoning and environmental fields.
83. East Camelback Homeowners Ass'n v. Arizona Foundation for Neurology & Psychiatry, 18 Ariz. App. 121, 500 P.2d 906 (1972) (standing issue not raised); Selden v.
Capitol Hill Southeast Citizens Ass'n, 219 F.2d 33, cert. denied, 349 U.S. 944 (1955); see
note 19 supra. Citizens for Better Gov't v. County of Valley, 95 Idaho 320, 508 P.2d 550
(1973) (a declaratory judgment action questioning the validity of a county zoning ordinance on procedural gounds; no discussion of the standing issue; based on a rudimentary
form of zoning with no provision for a board of appeals); Garden Dist. Property Owners
Ass'n, Inc. v. City of New Orleans, 98 So.2d 922 (La. App. 1957), see note 40 supra and
accompanying text; City of Omaha v. Glissman, 151 Neb. 895, 39 N.W.2d 828 (1949)
(standing for intervention, based on a "standard" statute; no conceptual discussion).
84. The New York courts have lost no time in following Douglaston. On the very day
Judge Jasen's opinion was handed down, December 20, 1974, a 600 member civic association known as Residents For a More Beautiful Port Washington, Inc., argued its case
against the North Hempstead Town Board of Zoning and Appeals before Judge Beatrice
Burstein in Nassau County Supreme Court. Judge Burstein, applying the Douglaston
formulation, granted the civic association standing, as well as victory on the merits.
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has enabled the combined pressure of neighboring property owners to be brought to bear in reviewing such decisions in the courts,
it is also hoped that local zoning officials and boards, whose determinations have upon occasion been characterized by a somewhat casual attitude towards the strict requirements of the law,
will be encouraged to render more uniformly responsible decisions.
Joel H. Joseph
Blumenfeld v. Board of Zoning & Appeals, North Hempstead, 173 N.Y.L.J. 43, March 5,
1975, at 18, col. 6. According to the local press, the Town plans to appeal the decision,
based on its contention that "Judge Burstein 'overlooked' [the requirement] that in order
to be an 'aggrieved party' a plaintiff ha[s] to demonstrate that he. . . suffered harm or
damage, almost always of a financial nature." Port Washington News, March 27, 1975,
at 1, cols. 1-2.
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APPENDIX I

STATUTORY PROVISIONS FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW OF
ZONING DETERMINATIONS
Alabama: ALA. CODE tit. 37, § 783 (1958).
Alaska: ALASKA STAT. § 29.33.130 (1962).
Arizona: ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9-465E (1956) (repealed Laws
1973 ch. 178 § 1, eff. 1/1/74). See also § 9-462.06E.
Arkansas: ARK. STAT. ANN. § 19-2806; § 19-2830.1 (1968).
California: CAL. CIv. PRO. § 1094.5 (West 1955).
Colorado: COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 106-2-17 (1963).
Connecticut: CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 8-8 (1971).
Delaware: DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 22 § 328 (a) & (b)(1953).
District of Columbia: D.C. CODE ENCYCL. ANN. § 5-420 (1966).
Florida: FLA. STAT. ANN. § 176.16, § 176.17 (1966) (repealed
Laws 1973, c. 73-129, § 5, eff. 10/1/73).
Georgia: GA. CODE ANN. §§ 69-827-832 (1967).
Hawaii: HAWAII REV. STAT. § 46-4(b); § 91-14 (1968).
Idaho: IDAHO CODE §§ 50-1201 - 1210 (1967).
Illinois: ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, § 11-13-13 (1962).
Indiana: IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 18-7-5-87 to -92 (1974).
Iowa: IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 414.15 - 18 (1949).
Kansas: KAN. STAT. ANN. § 19-2913; § 19-2934a (1963).
Kentucky: Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 100.079 -085 (1969). (repealed
Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91).
Louisiana: LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 33:4727 (1966).
Maine: ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 4954.2 (1964).
Maryland: MD. ANN. CODE art. 66B, § 4.08(a) (1970).
Massachusetts: MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 40A, § 21 (1968).
Michigan: MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 125.590 (1967).
Minnesota: MINN. STAT. ANN. § 462.357 Subd. 6 (Supp. 1974).
Mississippi: MISS. CODE ANN. § 17-1-17 (1972).
Missouri: Mo. ANN. STAT. § 89.110 (1971).
Montana: MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 11-2707 (8) & (9) (1947).
Nebraska: NEB. REV. STAT. § 19-912 (1970).
Nevada: NEV. REV. STAT. § 278.317(1); § 278.027 (1973).
New Hampshire: N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 31:77-87 (1970).
New Jersey: N.J. REv. STAT. §§ 40:55-36-49 (1967); § 40:5547.1 (1969).
New Mexico: N.M. STAT. ANN. § 14-20-7; § 14-20-23 (1953).
New York: N.Y. GEN. CrrY LAW §§ 38, 82 (McKinney 1968);
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N.Y. TOWN LAW § 267, subd. 2, 7 (McKinney 1965); N.Y.

§ 7-712, subd. 3 (McKinney 1973).
North Carolina: N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-345(e) (1974).
VLLAGE LAW

North Dakota:

N.D. CENT. CODE § 11-33-12 (1960).

Ohio: OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 519.15 (Supp. 1973).
Oklahoma: OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 408 (1959).
Oregon: ORE. REV. STAT. § 227.180 (4); § 34.020 (1973).
Pennsylvania: PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 11001-11011; § 14579;
§ 25057; § 58107; § 67007 (19 ). (Last two §§ repealed 1968,
P.L. 805, No. 247, art. XII, § 1201, eff. 1/1/69).
Puerto Rico: P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 23, §§ 28(d) - (f) (Supp. 1974).
Rhode Island: R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 45-24-20 (1971).
South Carolina: S.C. CODE ANN. § 47-1014 (1962).
South Dakota: S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. §§ 11-4-25 - 29 (1967).
Tennessee: TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 13-705 - 713; §§ 13-406 - 409
(1973).
Texas: TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. art. 1011g (j) - (o) (Supp. 1974).
Utah: UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9-15 (1953).
Vermont: VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 4471 (1967).
Virgin Islands: V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 270 (1962).
Virginia: VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-497 (1973).
Washington: WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 36.70.890 (1964).
West Virginia: W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8-24-59, 60 (1969).
Wisconsin: WIS. STAT. ANN. § 62.23(7)(e) (1957).
Wyoming: Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 15.1-89(h)-(k) (1965).
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APPENDIX II

Provisions of ALl MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE (Proposed
Official Draft No. 1, April 1974) cited in Douglaston Civic Ass'n,
Inc. v. Galvin.
Section 2-307. Neighborhood Organizations
(1) A neighborhood organization qualified under this Section may participate in administrative hearings under § 2304(2)(c), request and receive notices under § 2-306(1)(c), bring
judicial proceedings under § 9-103 and exercise such other rights
not inconsistent with this Code as may be granted by a development ordinance. Nothing in this Section shall restrict the power
of the Land Development Agency to allow organizations not qualified under this Section also to participate in hearings or receive
notices.
(2) A neighborhood organization shall be qualified under
this Section if a Land Development Agency issues an order designating it as a qualified neighborhood organization.
(3) The Land Development Agency shall issue an order designating a neighborhood organization as qualified under this Section if it finds that
(a) the neighborhood organization has filed an application
showing
(i) its proposed boundaries, which encompass, at
least in part, land within the jurisdiction of the Land Development Agency,
(ii) the name and address of its representative or
office for the receipt of notices and other communications,
(iii) the names and addresses of its officers and
directors; and
(b) the neighborhood organization represents more than
[half] of the adults residing within its boundaries, for all or a
substantial part of the year, such representation to be shown by
membership or other evidence satisfactory to the Land Development Agency; and
(c) the neighborhood organization demonstrates that it
has at least [50] members; and
(d) at least [50] per cent of the area of the land within
the boundaries of the neighborhood organization is developed
for residential use [or is available for residential use under the
existing development controls]; and
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(e) full participating membership in the neighborhood
organization is open at least to all registered voters within its
boundaries.
(4) The Land Development Agency shall not refuse to designate a neighborhood organization as representative of a particular area merely because one or more other neighborhood organizations represent part or all of the same area as long as each complies with the requirements of this Section.
(5) The Land Development Agency shall establish an interval of time after which qualifications under this Section will expire unless renewed, which interval shall not be less than [two]
years or greater than [five] years. The Land Development
Agency shall give notice to the neighborhood organization of the
necessity for renewal not more than [six] months nor less than
[three] months prior to the expiration date.
Section 9-103. Persons Entitled to Initiate Judicial Proceedings
to Review Orders
(1) A judicial proceeding concerning an order of a Land
Development Agency granting or denying development permission or an enforcement order may be commenced only by:
(a) the owner of land involved in the order, or the applicant for the development permit involved;
(b) the local government which created the Land Development Agency; or
(c) a person to whom subsection (2), (3), (4) or (5) is applicable.
(2) If an order was required to be issued on the basis of a
record after an administrative hearing, a judicial proceeding may
be commenced by a person who became a party to the administrative hearing in the manner provided in § 2-304(5).
(3) If an order was issued without an administrative hearing, a judicial proceeding may be commenced by
(a) the owner of any land within [500] feet of the parcel
on which development is proposed; or
(b) any neighborhood organization qualified under § 2-307
by the Land Development Agency if the boundaries of the organization include any part of the parcel on which development
is proposed or of any land within [500] feet of that parcel.
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(4) Notwithstanding the limitations on persons entitled to
commence judicial proceedings in the preceding subsections, a
person who was improperly denied an opportunity to participate
in a required administrative hearing may pursue a proceeding to
review.
(5) The court may grant leave to pursue an action to review
an order to a person not entitled under the preceding subsections
who establishes that he has a significant interest that has been
injured by an order and that the interest was not adequately
represented in the administrative proceeding.
(6) A judicial proceeding to determine the validity of an
order of the State Land Adjudicatory Board under Article 7 may
be commenced only by a person who was a party to the proceeding before the Board or by the local government in which the land
involved is located.
(7) For the purpose of determining the persons entitled to
initiate judicial proceedings to determine the validity of an order
of the State Land Planning Agency, the order shall be treated as
if it were a rule of that Agency.
Section 9-104. Persons Entitled to Initiate JudicialProceedings
to Review Rules and Ordinances
In the absence of an order, a proceeding to review a rule of
the State Land Planning Agency or a rule or ordinance of a local
government may be commenced only by
(1) an owner of land subject to the rule or ordinance;
(2) an owner of land within [500] feet of any land subject
to the rule or ordinance;
(3) a neighborhood organization qualified under § 2-307 by
the local Land Development Agency if the boundaries of the organization include any part of the land subject to the rule or
ordinance, or any land within [500] feet of any land subject to
the rule or ordinance;
(4) any governmental agency other than an agency created
solely by the local government which adopted the ordinance or
rule;
(5) a person claiming that the ordinance or rule deprives
him or persons he represents of rights given him by the constitution or laws of the United States or of his State;
(6) any other person satisfying the court that he has a significant interest that has been injured by the ordinance or rule.
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Section 10-102. Enforcement by Persons Other than the Local
Government
(1) No person other than the local government, or the appropriate officer on direction of the local government, may prosecute a violation of an enforcement order.
(2) A person may bring a civil action to prevent, restrain,
correct or abate a violation of an order, rule or ordinance, or to
obtain other preventive relief including appointment of a receiver, if he would have been entitled to initiate judicial proceedings under §9-103(3) to review the grant of a general development
permit relating to the parcel on which the alleged violation has
occurred or will occur.
(3) Notice of any proceeding brought by a person other than
the local government shall be given to the local government.
(4) If a person other than the local government brings a
civil action as authorized by subsection (2) and he is successful
in obtaining relief, the court may allow him reasonable expenses
of his litigation, [including attorney's fees,] and the allowance
shall be treated as part of the costs assessed.
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